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Trustees of the Reich

Chapter 7: papers of the deads (Jewish stocks, bonds, commercial papers)

Part 1: Case with Mr. Meyer: two bonds of Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen in Strasbourg -- affidavits as confirmation of innocence for commercial papers - faked affidavits allowing tremendous profits with ruthless Swiss bankers from Bank Corporation, Union Bank (Bankgesellschaft) and Confederate Bank (Eidgenössische Bank "Eiba") -- Currie Agreement in March 1945 with measures against the Third Reich

Translation by Michael Palomino (2013)


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from: Peter Balzli: Treuhänder des Reichs. Eine Spurensuche. Werd-Verlag, Zürich 1997

* Names with a * are changed by the author protecting the personality (p.15)

[Names of banks in Switzerland are often changing. It is a normal "trick" of Swiss criminal bankster's world to "
purchase each other" for letting "disappear" certain names of banks concealing the bank's criminality in some way in Switzerland. Therefore the name of before and of today is often indicated].

<Papers of the deads

German SS and currency protection commands are robbing stocks and bonds of a value of over 100 million. Swiss banks are the buyers.

[But there are more buyers for sure, perhaps also Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Turkish oar also Swedish and South "American" banks. Eventually even Arab countries - which were well loved by Hitler against the Jews - were purchasers of Jewish commercial papers. But in this chapter the investigation is limited to Swiss banks only].


[Case with Mr. Meyer: two bonds of Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen in Strasbourg]

[Frenchman Mr. Ernst Meyer from Strasbourg - valorizing a Swiss bond of 1940 is impossible - bond sewed in the coat - deportation to Poland - SS finds the bond - selling of the bond by German Reichsbank and by Swiss National Bank in Saint Gallen with avail for the Reich]

Frenchman Mr. Ernst Meyer had a big confidence into Switzerland. In 1936 he was investing a part of his fortune in a sure way. He was from Strasbourg and on October 22, he bought two bonds of Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen for 10,000 Swiss Francs. He stored the bonds in his house. But Mr. Meyer was not living for a long time any more, and his wife Mrs. Augustine was inheriting the two precious papers. But this was a life insurance without future. War was breaking out and the bonds were due on October 22, 1940, but it was not possible to cash the bonds. Additionally the days for her under German occupation rule were limited what she knew well. As a precaution she was sewing the two bonds into one of her clothes and when she would be detained in the beginning of 1943 she could take the bonds on her body. Nazis were deporting her to Poland after a short time and what happened then nobody knows. Whereas the Jewish woman Augustine Meyer-Ortlieb was probably murdered there is no track of her. [May be she was deported from Auschwitz to the Gulag or she died in Hitler's tunnel systems or she survived and changed her name]. Just to the contrary there is the track of the bond. This bond was coming up in summer 1944 already - and was now in the possession of German Reichsbank.

For Hitler's bankers such a procedure was pure routine. They were not only valorizing jewelry, looted gold and teeth of the deads, but they were valorizing also a part of the commercial papers from expropriated or robbed victims. Sellings were proceded with the partners in Switzerland [and eventually also in Spain, Portugal, in Turkey, in Sweden and in South "America"]. In the case of Mr. Meyer German Reichsbank was chosing the most comfortable way and was sending the obligation with the number 7473 of a nominal worth of 5,000 Swiss Francs to a colleague in Zurich. Swiss National Bank (SNB) was getting this paper which was pricked all over and handed it to it's branch in Saint Gallen for cashing it's nominal value with interests by order of the Nazis at the Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen. But then there was a problem. Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen was communicating to the branch of SNB [p.173] that this bond was blocked. Already in April 1943 the control company in Geneva (Sociètè Gènèrale de Surveillance SA) and Mr. Fredy Guggenheim from Saint Gallen, a familiar member of the Meyers, had communicated to the Cantonal Bank
that Mrs. Meyer-Ortlieb was in a concentration camp and therefore this obligation had to be blocked.

But in the following time the local bankers did not control if this block of the paper ordered from Geneva was valid yet. They were only confirming with Guggenheim, who had committed an error - the Cantonal Bank of Saint Gallen had not mentioned the name of "Meyer" in it's letter - was approving that he had nothing against a valorization of the bond. Then Swiss National Bank was cashing this bond to the German Reichsbank on July 26, 1944, with 5,078.45 Swiss Francs. But this normal business should convert into a boomerang.

[After 1945 son Mr. Robert Jean Meyer as the legal heirs requires the payment of the bond]

Hitler's terrorism did not destroy the whole family of Meyer-Ortlieb. The son Robert Jean Meyer survived and after the war he wanted to have the heritage of his mother who was probably murdered [or was deported to the Gulag and behind the Iron Curtain then or had changed her name or something else]. The confrontation with the bankers of Eastern Switzerland was preprogrammed because Mr. Meyer knew about the warning by the security company "Surveillance" [in Geneva]. But the Cantonal Bank did not think about of any reimbursement of these 5078.45 Swiss Francs. But the cantonal bank said that Swiss National Bank would be responsible for the stolen bond because she did mediate it.

"Die Kantonalbank beruft sich darauf, dass sich 'unsere oberste Landesbehörde verpflichtet habe, nachweisbares Beutegut zurückzuerstatten'. Sie erwartet deshalb von der Nationalbank, dass die zu Unrecht erfolgte Gutschrift zugunsten der Reichsbank rückgängig gemacht werde und der Betrag von Fr. 5078,45 an die Kantonalbank zugunsten der Angehörigen von Frau Meyer-Ortlieb vergütet werde",

"Cantonal Bank is referring to teh fact that 'our supreme federal authority had obliged to reimburse loot which is profed'. Thus Cantonal Bank is awaiting from Swiss National Bank that the illegal credit note for German Reichsbank will be reversed and the amount of 5078.45 Swiss Francs will be refunded in favor of the familiar members of Mrs. Meyer Ortlieb",





this said the minutes of Swiss National Bank (SNB) of December 20, 1945.

Now the bankers of Swiss National Bank were not at all in any stress with this claim from provincial cantonal bank. Above all the fact that the bankers of Saint Gallen had not inquired at the security company "Surveillance" - this was the principal argument number 1 for the defense.

"Zunächst ist klar, dass für das Versehen, das der Sanktgallischen Kantonalbank unterlaufen ist, nur diese selbst, nicht aber auch unser Institut verantwortlich gemacht werden kann."

"First it's clear that for this fault which has committed Saint Gallen Kantonalbank only this cantonal bank itself can be responsible and not our institute."





[New law of looted goods in Switzerland - mediators of looted goods are not torn to justice - local court of Saint Gallen is condemning the cantonal bank - Swiss National Bank is rejecting any guilt - cantonal bank of Saint Gallen indicates the stitches in the bond document]

And according to the law Swiss National Bank thought all would be safe. Since ten days there had been a federal government's decision according to claims for reimborsement and refunding of looted values from occupied territories. This so called law of looted goods was projecting that there would be a right for getting back values but the claimant had to come to Switzerland personally. As [p.174] Swiss National Bank was neither in the possession of the bond neither of the 5,078.45 Swiss Francs, she considered that there was no responsibility for it at all. From the juridical point the claims could be rejected.

The fact that Swiss National Bank had worked as a dealer for looted commercial papers did not play any role in the brains of the national bankers. But the affair was rated as uncomfortable because in the meantime a certain part of the public was sensitive to the topic now.

"Fraglich bleibt indessen, ob eine solche Ablehnung politisch angezeigt erscheint, da sie uns möglicherweise als eine Begünstigung der deutschen Seite ausgelegt werden könnte",

"But it remains the question if such a rejection is indicated politically because it could be that our manner of thinking can be considered as German friendly",





in this way was the discussion at Swiss National Bank. By tactic reasons there was the new consideration to get an authorization of the cleaning office for a subsequent charge of the blocked assets of German Reichsbank [in Switzerland all German assets were blocked for 2 years from 1945 to 1947] or one could "arrange an agreement for a compensation of the damage without recognizing any guilt paying an amount for 2,500 Swiss Francs." But there were only considerations, there was no resolution taken in this direction.

In the Meyer case Saint Gallen Cantonal Bank remained hard. It did not want to know anything about political considerations and not at all anything about a goodwill gesture. But this cantonal bank was rejecting the heirs. Son Mr. Robert Jean Meyer had no other choice and he had to file a lawsuit against Saint Gallen Cantonal Bank at the local court. The procedure was ending with a huge defeat for the hardliner of this cantonal bank of eastern Switzerland. The judges had clearly the meaning that Saint Gallen cantonal bank had a "big culpability" and there had been a qualified "heavy negligence of the obligations" because the bond - which had been blocked by the security company in Geneva "Sociètè Gènèrale de Surveillance SA" - had been cashed out without any permission of the security company or without any contact. Additionally the local court did not consider any reason why the Swiss National Bank should have any responsibility in this affair.

Despite of the defeat the cantonal bank was rejecting any compensation for the Meyer heirs. This was communicated to Swiss National Bank in November 1946. After the clear local court's decision Swiss National Bank did not see any reason to take Saint Gallen Cantonal Bank earnest for any claim to recourse. But the Second Department was once again discussing the idea to have an agreement paying 2,500 Swiss Francs. But the First and the Third Department were rejecting this idea. They were convinced of the guilt of the cantonal bank [p.175]. As a consequence there was a fight between the two banking institutions. The director of Saint Gallen National Bank was coming in person to Zurich being convinced that Swiss National Bank (SNB) must have had recognized that a bond with stitches was a looted one. And Swiss National Bank was countering:

"Das Vorhandensein von Nadelstichen bildete noch keinen genügenden Anhaltspunkt für die Annahme, dass es sich um Raubgut handle, zumal die Methoden des Dritten Reiches im Sommer 1944 noch keineswegs so bekannt waren, wie sie es später geworden sind",

"Stitches in a bond document are not a sufficient indication for the assumption that the good is looted good, for the methods of the Third Reich were not at all known yet in summer 1944 how it was coming out later",





this was the meaning of the bosses of Swiss National Bank in a meeting in November.

[The process of Saint Gallen Cantonal Bank against Swiss National Bank because of stitches]

Bankers of Eastern Switzerland were making clear to the monetary authorities that the cantonal bank was willing to make further steps with the lawsuit up to the Federal Court [in Lausanne], also when there should be one more defeat. But a lawsuit between a cantonal bank and the National Bank would not be good for the reputation and certain press members would have their joy to exploit this case. Therefore the cantonal bank was making the proposal which SNB had considered before already. There should be an agreement and the compensation of the heirs should be half and half taken over by the two banks.

This threat with a big lawsuit was not keeping the national bosses cold. There was no doubt that the bankers of Eastern Switzerland would do it "after Saint Gallen Cantonal Bank did not hesitate fighting a lawsuit against the heirs with a terrible defeat". And the bankers of the National Bank were fearing even more the reaction of the public. Businesses with looted gold from the Nazis had damaged the reputation enough already. Further scandals of this class had to be omitted. A public court case "with reports from the press in just not a comfortable way would not be desired at all", meant the directorate. Fro keeping the case secret there was taken the decision finally to propose the cantonal bank a not public arbitration proceedings. Additionally there was the clear meaning that the claims of the heirs had to be done according to the local court's decision of before.

Saint Gallen bankers were rejecting this but were acting on their threat. They were moving on the case. Mr. Robert Jean Meyer was fighting for his money since more than one year now. On December 5, 1946, he had to go to the court a second time. Cantonal bank was trying to be innocent [p.176] claiming that the block of the bond of 1943 had been non-binding. There should have been a "compensation proceedure" but this had not been. By this reason there had been also only a conversation with Mr. Guggenheim and there had been no conversation with the security company "Surveillance" [in Geneva]. But not only this: Saint Gallen bankers were claiming now that Mrs. Augustine Meyer was robbed - but the crimes of Hitler's system were well known to a broad public in this point of time. It would not be sure that "the bond had been taken from the claimant illegally". When there had been a confiscation then this had been because of the violation of the currency regulations. For the bank this was "not an illegal" rule considering the rule of the times before.

Now the judges of the canton of Saint Gallen was considering the case in another way. They followed the facts described by Mr. Meyer. Based on the knowledge about "conditions in such camps" [robbing the suit case, controls and denounciations, death in tunnel systems or secret deportations to the Gulag or changing the name] they assumed "a probable complete possibility" that the bond had been confiscated without any compensation and was taken from Mrs. Augustine Meyer against her will. "It seems practically excluded that there had been a normal transfer of ownership according to normal law which would withstand Swiss regulations, because the complainant was also a Jewish family." The judges could not find any excuse for the cantonal bank becasue this bank had eveno communication with the safety company "Surveillance" in 1943 yet. Surveillance had sent a letter to the cantonal bank in 1943 yet that this bond will be blocked. The facts that the Geneva safety company was not taking any further measure and that Mr. Guggenheim had nothing against a payment did not play any role. According to the judges the cantonal bank had to expect that the bond had been taken illegally from Mrs. Augustine Meyer and German Reichsbank had not been the real owner. The encashment of Swiss National Bank did not change anything with it.

"Befriedigte sie den Inhaber des Titels dennoch, so wendete sie die Sorgfalt, die von einem kantonalen Bankinstitut im Verkehr erwartet werden darf, nicht auf und handelte grobfahrlässig",

"National Bank was disbursing the bond without the accuracy which can be awaited to be performed by a cantonal banking institution in the banking business. Thus Swiss National Bank was acting grossly negligent",





this was the meaning of the judges confirming the clear court's decision of the local court of before. Saint Gallen bankers had to surrender and had to pay. Thei rejected to a lawsuit against Swiss National Bank.


[Affidavits as a confirmation of innocence for commercial papers - faked affidavits permitting high profits with ruthless Swiss bankers from Swiss Bank Corporation, Union Bank UBS and Swiss Corporate Bank (Eiba)]

[The introduction of affidavits - ruthless Swiss bankers let fake affidavits selling commercial papers with enormous profits]

The affair with Meyer-Ortlieb family was no singular case. Switzerland during the times of the Third Reich was the most important market for robbed and confiscated [p.177] commercial papers. First the stocks and bonds were coming from Germany and from Austria, and after the outbreak of the World War in Europe they also came from the occupied territories. Well, officially these deals with stolen goods were forbidden. For hindering the business with stolen commercial papers and for protecting the good merchants the management boards of Swiss stock exchange and of Swiss banks had introduced so called affidavits for foreign commercial papers. They should confirm that the commercial paper had been in Swiss hands or at least in neutral hands since the outbreak of the war or since another certain deadline. But this rule had not a big effect. As the Meyer case is proving the Swiss commercial papers in German possession were not included with this. Additionally the introduction of affidavits had the consequence that there was a black market for commercial papers without affidavits with a heavy price difference between the paper with affidavit and without it. And ruthless bankers were detecting the loop hole with the artificial difference of innocence at once and they made cash without limits with it in a large scale..

The manipulation of the affidavit's rule was simple. Stolen commercial papers were taken from the German side with a low price mostly. Then the merchants were purchasing faked affidavits and were reselling the papers for the higher market price. Already since 1940 these methods were developing as a real separate sector in the banker's scene. There were stocks of Royal Dutch, there were "American" stocks, there were German stocks, there were French or Norwegian gilts (state's bonds). And with this material Swiss bankers were faking everything for getting the enormous profit margin and the Nazi pray found it's new owners without problem with it. The authorities had no idea of it for a long time.

[The faked affidavits are coming up - monstrous lawsuit in Switzerland - raids at cadres of Swiss banks - detentions and 508 folders - 661,000 Swiss Francs pure profit by fraud with affidavits]

Zurich stock exchange commissionar's office was detecting the varied affidavit fakes only in autumn of 1941. Controlling the stock exchange journals there was the strikening fact that a company which was either possessing a legitimation for stock trade outside of stock exchange neither was controlled by banking law, this company had very high turnover rates. After a coordination with the directors of Federal Economy Department the authorities were denouncing these events at the local Zurich court in November [1941]. The dimensions of the following inquiry were singular. It was similar to the investigations in Italy of today [p.178]

known as "Mani pulite" actions and at the end the prosecutors were suspecting several dozen persons. Almot every day the affair was broadening it's dimension.

At the beginning the searchers were only investigating the dubious company without trade approval. But after several house searches of caders it became clear that also the connections to the ring banks had to be screened. Already in this secons phase a big number of titles without affidavits could be found which got their affidavits after passing the washhouse and then the papers had been resold at Zurich, Basel and Geneva stock exchange. In this connection the authorities detected fast that there were more fakes there. The Organized Crime hat it's centers in the Nazi center of Davos, and also in Chur and in Geneva.

In the French part of Switzerland (Romandy) there was a special play executed by unscrupulous banksters. With the bonds they were faking also the English Non-Enemy-Possession-Declarance. When the British rejected the payment for the affected bonds some Geneva people were so criminal to intervene at the Swiss Federal Politic Department making a protest at the embassy in London. But this embarrassing action could be blocked yet because the fakers had been detained before. In other cases the French speaking culprits were engaging prominent trustee companies between the fakers and the banks. They got faked documents which were partly attested by notaries, so the trustees were giving in to approve the affidavits.

At the end the search documents of the Zurich authorities comprised 508 folders. The total value of the investigated transacitons was 2 million 719,000 Swiss Francs. The profit margin in this business was enormous. With all these tricks the 38 involved persons had made a gross cash of 661,000 Swiss Francs totally. Just the half of the fakers landed in pretrial imprisonment for some months.

At the same time also the Federal Banking Commission was occupied with the results of the Zurich investigation. According to the session's protocoll of June 21, 1943, there were 7 companies involved in this affair:
-- Banque Populaire de la Broye,
-- Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas,
-- Travel office and Banking business Kleiner & Cie. in Davos
-- Banca Solari SA,
-- Märki Baumann & Cie,
-- Vontobel & Cie.,
-- Zurich seat of Swiss Bank Corporation (Schweizerischen Bankvereins), and
-- Bank E. Winterstein [p.179].

According to the banking control the banks Vontobel and Märki Baumann were involved without guilt and it was a personal affair of their representatives. The action against the representatives of Solari SA was abated. But the employees of the remnant companies had acted clear illegally. Above all the case of Winterstein was mysterios. In the documents of Swiss Federal prosecution service Winterstein was registered as a Jewish banker whereas according to statements of today of family members he was not at all a Jews. Federal prosecution service was ranking the banker for "politically doubtful" and spies gave more and more indications that Winterstin was changing money into Swiss Francs for Germans at the end of 1944 yet, and he was hiding high sums of Nazi bosses. Concering the affidavit fakes the Zurich stock exchange commission was "thinking about to deprive the stock exchange legitimation" - according to the bank's commission.

[More affairs - not only in the criminal and partly Anti-semitic Zurich - banker's association denying to know anything - Zurich justice giving in giving away many cases - 9 culprits remain and the banks even get a compensation...]

The supreme bank's controllers were busy not only with the Zurich affair where looted stocks were traded. Already some weeks before the office of the bank's commission had got an anonymous letter of "highstreet banks' clerks" with the claim against the leader of the banking business having sold stocks for millions which had been confiscated in German occupied countries. Then the office leader Mr. Max Hommel was speaking and searching around a little bit and he declared amazing things during the session of June 21 [1941]:

Original in German:
"Die Tatsache, dass in der Schweiz ausländische Titel zirkulieren, die durch die Hand einer Besatzungsmacht gegangen sind, ist kein Geheimnis mehr. Der Effektenbörsenverein Zürich hat ein Zirkular erlassen, worin erklärt wird, dass solche Titel 'keine guten Lieferung darstellen'. (...) Bei der Bankiervereinigung, mit der ich persönlich Fühlung nahm, wollte von diesen Titeln allerdings niemand etwas wissen, was mir eigentlich unangenehm aufgefallen ist", erzählte Hommel.


Translation:
"The fact that in Switzerland are circulating stocks and documents having passed the hands of an occupation power is not a secret any more. The Zurich stock exchange association (Effektenbörsenverein) has published a circular declaring that such stocks "are not a good delevery". (...) At the bankier's association which I was contacting personally nobody wanted to know anything about such stocks and I have to day, this was striking to me in an uncomfortable way", Hommel was telling.

Also in Berne he only met closed ears.

Original in German:
"Beim Politischen Departement hat mir Herr Dr. Kohli mitgeteilt, diese Geschäfte würden auf Gefahr der Banken abgeschlossen; das Politische Departement trete auf die Erklärung der alliierten Nationen vom Januar 1943 (Warnung vor Raubgütern, d.Verf.) grundsätzlich nicht ein. Herr Kohli hielt das Zirkular des Effektenbörsenvereins sogar für unvorsichtig und riet davon ab, etwas zu unternehmen."


Translation:
"I got a response from Mr. Dr. Kohli from the Federal Political Department [Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs] that the banks are responsible for their business; Swiss Deparment of Foreign Affairs principally does not accept the declaration of the allied nations of January 1943 (warning from looted goods, the writer). Mr. Kohli considered the circular of the stock exchange association even as careless and dehorted to take any action."


According to all evidence the decisive Swiss authorities were not interested in [p.180]

to stop the dealing in stolen goods serving the Nazis. This position should also be copied fast within responsible Swiss justice offices.

The effort which was made first in Zurich justice for the affidavit's affair was coming down more and more during 1943 and 1944. Several cases were closed because of not being responsible and were shifted to the affected cantons of Geneva, Grison and Vaud. In Zurich itself the prosecution service was closing the proceedings agaisnt 12 persons because the pure fake of documents was not a delict yet before January 1, 1942. Because of lack of proof of damage no betrial could be proved allegedly. Additionally the very motivated authorities were more or less stopping their activity and were not even able to prove the precise origin of the stocks and documents any more. At the end only 9 culprits remained, all were unknown businessemen or were little bank clerks. The involved banks even got a compensation of 242,280 Swiss Francs from the confiscated funds.

[After 1945 nobody wants to have a judgement concerning the affidavit fakes - the case is shifted back and forth]

In August 1944 the Zurich prosecution service was deposing the indictment at the indictment office of Zurich Supreme Court. The banker's circles were not interested at all, and the trial was stopped definitevely now. The Zurich Supreme Court was protracting the assessment of the affair during two years. In summer 1946 the judges were taking the resultion to reject the indictment urging for more investigation. The prosecution service was protesting against this decision with an appeal but this was a failure at the end. In April 1947 the documents were shifted back to the Zurich local court (Bezirksanwaltschaft). In the meantime the case had been modified and had to be reassessed. At the end of 1948 the never ending case was still deposed in the offices of the Zurich administration authorities. Nobody was interested for a real judgement, and this was also confessed by the Zurich justice director in a session of the canton's council at November 29, 1948.

Original in German:
"Es ist jetzt aber dafür gesorgt, dass der Affidavit-Prozess, wenigstens soweit es von der Staatsanwaltschaft abhängt, rasch gefördert und zum Abschluss gebracht wird. Praktisch hat die Strafuntersuchung schon seit Anfang 1942 durch die Versetzung der Hauptangeschuldigten in Untersuchungshaft und Beschlagnahme des Vermögens ihren Zweck weitgehend erreicht, indem die Angeschuldigten schon durch diese Massnahmen gründlich getroffen wurden und seither im Kanton Zürich weitere derartige Strafuntersuchungen  (S.181)
nicht mehr eingeleitet werden mussten."


Translation:
"There were measures now to bring the affidavit affair to a fast end at least concerning the prosecution service. The investigation was reaching at the beginning of 1942 already it's purpose when the main culprits wer taken into pretrial imprisonment and fortunes were confiscated. The defendants have been hit hard already by this and since then in the canton of Zurich similar investigations [p.181] had not to be performed any more."



The last argument was justified by the justice director that the affidavit law had been toughened during the war.

[Faked affidavits: the allies are listening - the "American" consul Mr. Sholes estimates the volume of the fraud to up to 10 million Swiss Francs - stolen stocks and documents in German diplomat's luggage from Paris for Swiss Bank Corporation (Schweizerischer Bankverein, SBV) with vice director Ribi and general director Hurter]

In this way the faker's affair about affidavits was fizzling out in a mysterious way but the allies could watch this. Above all the Americans were interested in Swiss deals with looted goods already during the war. For them this was not accidential that the investigation of Zurich public authorities was fizzling. The involved banks were very known and had enough political power to be freed of the any persecution. For keeping a facade of a state of law the affair ended for the justice system with some little banking clerks as sacrificial lambs.

In a report of the American consulate in Basel from June 1944 also the State Department ["U.S." Department of Foreign Affairs] in Washington got the list who was involved in this faker's scandal. To the contrary to the Zurich authorities the consul Mr. Walter Sholes was estimating the volume of the fraud up to 10 million Swiss Francs. The investigations of Mr. Sholes were concentrating mainly to Swiss Bank Corporation in Zurich (Schweizerischer Bankverein) [this criminal Swiss bank has it's main seat in Basel and was recalled UBS AG in 1998 absorbing UBS with it's center in Zurich]. According to the Americans vice director [of Swiss Bank Corporation] Mr. August Ribi was one of the key figures concerning the business with looted goods. Mr. Kurz Eichel, the German commissionar at Paris Westminster Bank, and his assist Mr. Wilhelm Lein, were regularly delivering looted stocks and documents in their diplomat luggage from France, Holland or Belgium. According to Mr. Sholes the cadre of Zurich Bankverein branch was organizing then a valorization of the prey [at Zurich stock exchange]. But during the investigation of Zurich prosecution authorities in 1942 Mr. Ribi was not touched. Instead of his person the nephew of SBV general director, Mr. Karl Türler, and also Mr. Werner Hurter had to suffer a detention behing bars for several months. House searches were organized and there are indications that Swiss police found some several 100,000 Swiss Francs in the flat of Hurter under the carpet.

[Hurter converting to be a key witness against crmiinal Swiss Bank Corporation (Schweizerischer Bankverein, SBV) - fakes in the 1930s already - repurchase of "bad stocks and securities"]

Now Hurter was performing a revenge. Because he had to take the blame for his boss [Ribi] and because his professional position was ruined he was presenting his knowledge to the Americans relentlessly now. On November 1, 1943, together with a present lawyer he was telling the complete story. His statements were confirming the informations of the Americans. Mr. Ribi got big amounts of looted stocks and documents being brought by the Nazis from the occupied countries. According to Hurter to these documents German control documents were added [p.182].

Swiss Bank Corporation [the directors] took these batches away and added faked affidavits to the stocks or bonds. With this fake they could be sold well on the Swiss market for a good price. Hurter added that Swiss Bank Corporation (SBV) had got a big delivery from the Germans just during the last week again.

The key witness was even going further with his allegations. Mr. Hurter claimed that Swiss Bank Corporation had a long tradition with criminal business actions. He told that at the  beginning of the 1930s there had been a big scandal in the U.S.A. about faked affidavits already. In the meantime SBV bank had become anxious for being torn to justice after the war for it's business activities. Therefore the bank was repurchasing now secretly the "bad" stocks and securities. The American diplomats were aware of the fact that Hurter had a hatred and that he was exagerating a little bit with his allegations against SBV bank. But the core of the story could not be a fake.

And this is confirming Swiss Bank Corporation today itself. Over 50 years after the affair and after several dozens of denials of Basel there is a late confession now.

"Bei den damaligen Affidavitsfälschungen waren auch Mitarbeiter des SBV beteiligt. Diese wurden aber entlassen"

"In this affair about faked affidavits also staff members of SBV were a part of it. But they were dismissed"

a speaker said. But vice director Ribi is still washed clean. Voices say that he had not been involved into the affair. This confirmation not being guilty is not amazing. After the war Mr. Ribi was promoted to be the deputy director.

[Further criminal Swiss banks with faked affidavits: UBS and Federal Bank (Eiba)]

But the Americans did not only watch Swiss Bank Corporation. As Swiss authorities were not at all persecuting any other banks than they had on their list there were just other banks, too, which were not harmed by their clerks, but they [the directors] were culprits. Next to the Basel highstreet bank [Swiss Bank Corporation SBV, recalled in 1998 as UBS AG] there were more banks involved handling this dark business like the prominent banks like Swiss Union Bank of Switzerland [UBS, since 1998 UBS AG being absorbed by Swiss Bank Corporation], and there was Federal Bank (Eidgenössische Bank [which was called Eiba, later absorbed by UBS]). After the war should be confirmed that the Americans were right with their spying work not only concerning Swiss Bank Corporation but also with the other banks. But they were not right with their estimations concerning the volume of the fraud. Reality was even more dramatic.

At the beginning of 1945 during the Zurich affidavit affair a development was beginning which was really frightening the banks [p.183].


[Currie Agreement in March 1945 with measures against Third Reich]

[The faked fight against currency exchange of the Third Reich]

During the war the allies were winning more and more since a long time already and they wanted to get their victory as fast as they could.
[WRONG: Eisenhower was prolonging the war deliberately by 2 years
Eisenhower was prolonging the war deliberately by doing nothing and by wrong tactics against his generals waiting for the atomic bomb against Germany which came "too late" at the end].

It was decisive that Germany was cut off the international financial centers. Currency, capital and valorization of looted goods had to be inhibited.
[WRONG: the fight against currency exchange is hiding the real truth
Until April 1945 "U.S.A." were delivering to the Reich war important goods above all the anti knocking agent. When this had been stopped in 1944 already the war in Europe had finished in August 1944 already because Hitler had had no gasoline any more and the partition of Germany had not been. This means that the "U.S.A." are not only responsible for the destruction of 50% of the German towns between August 1944 and May 1945, but they are also responsible for 100,000s when not for millions of lives of Germans and Russians. The fight against currency exchange is only a mock fight. Details are coming here]:
First it had to be hindered that the Germans could use the service of neutral financial centers. The allies were thinking above all of Switzerland. After years of warnings of looted German goods and hot money and after years of press attacks against the stubborn bankers the Americans were presenting to the Swiss at the end of January 1945 that Mr. Laughlin Currie was a special deputy of the president Theodor Roosevelt who sould come to Bern for economic negociations. About three weeks later this allied delegation was really coming to Bern under his leadership: they claimed from Switzerland to behave as a victory power in future adopting to the new military, political and economic situation. In clear words: it was urged that all transit traffic and all economic relations [to the Third Reich] were cut - among others also the purchase of gold by Federal National Bank [of Switzerland] should be cut.

[Blockagte of all German funds in Switzerland at February 15, 1945 - Swiss attempts of justification before the Amis]

The Currie negotiations were lasting from Feb. 12 to March 8, 1945. Swiss government was giving in during these negotiations by the allied pressure long before the negotiations ended. Already four days after the beginning of the fight it was declared that all German funds in Switzerland would be blocked. This was the measure which was considered by the allies as a decisive precondition for safe haven investigations [locations where Jews couls stay safely or officially as safely]. It should be investigated how much German capital was in Germany respectively how the shifting of hot money of the axis states had been to Switzerland. This task was attended finally by Swiss Clearing Office.

This fast decision of the Swiss government was provoking a storm of protests within Swiss economy circles. Above all Swiss Bankers Association which had not been contacted before the blockage decision by reasons of secrecy was reacting with massive protests. According to her manner of understanding an investigation about the German funds in Switzerland could have only heavy consecuences for Switzerland [p.184]

as a financial center. Totel secrecy was questioned now concerning any kind of klient which had always be a central propaganda argument for the clients. The claims to the Swiss government were arguing just in the same way then. The Bankiers Association claimed the complete secrecy concerning the survey results, claimed a decentral registration of the names of the bank account holders and claimed that this would not have a juridical effect in advance concerning the funds from other states, above all from France.

During this action the Bankers Association also presented itself having taken own measures. They mentioned the affidavit regulations which had more or less no effect, and they mentioned voluntary behavior regulations of the Swiss banks. In fact this Bankers Association had suggested very restrictive behavior regulations concerning looted goods and shifted nazi funds in a "very secret" circular. But the effect could not have been very big. The circular was from September 19, 1944. Thus the bankers had been given a cause for action only five years after the outbreak of the war and only by high pressure to limit the business with the Third Reich [p.185].

 
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